Journal of Accountancy
Volume 52

Issue 1

Article 1

7-1931

Editorial
A. P. Richardson

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons

Recommended Citation
Richardson, A. P. (1931) "Editorial," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 52 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol52/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

The Journal ofAccountancy
Official Organ of the American Institute of Accountants

A. P. Richardson, Editor
[Opinions expressed in THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY are not necessarily en
dorsed by the publishers or by the American Institute of Accountants. Articles are
chosen for their general interest, but beliefs and conclusions are often merely those of
individual authors.]

Vol. 52

July, 1931

No. 1

EDITORIAL
One of the most important judgments
ever rendered in the United States upon
a question involving the duties and
obligations of an accountant was the suit Ultramares Corporation
v. Touche et al. In the February issue of The Journal of
Accountancy there was somewhat extensive comment upon that
section of the decision which disposed of the question of liability
of the accountant to persons without privity of contract. At that
time we expressed the opinion, which has subsequently been in
dorsed by competent authority, that the American Institute of
Accountants, appearing as friend of the court and opposing the
attempt to extend liability to the wide world, had accomplished
complete success. The judgment was definite and apparently
left no room for doubt as to the limitations which surround the
legal liability of any professional man, even where gross negligence
is supposed to have existed. There has been a great deal of
correspondence on the subject of the judgment, and some people
without knowledge, but with a readiness to impute iniquity, have
jumped to the conclusion that the Institute condones negligence.
If these statements are not malicious they are too silly to merit
notice and, indeed, they do not deserve much consideration
whatever be their motive. The fact is that the Institute ap
peared in the case as amicus curiae and presented a brief which
was largely adopted by the court of appeals in the state of New
York. The Institute argued that there can be no liability where
there is no privity of interest. What the accountant’s individual
liability to his individual client may be is not the subject of
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present discussion, but it may be said in passing that it would be
an excellent thing if there could be a legal determination of the
extent of the accountant’s liability to his client. Nobody knows
what a court may assess as damages for failure to perform ac
counting work as it should be performed. The cases which have
been before the courts are not sufficiently representative to be
valuable as precedents, and even in those cases the differences of
judgments are so great that all dependence upon them is futile.
There seems to be no precedent which indicates the probable
extent of financial liability for professional services of any
kind.
In our earlier discussion of the Ultra

The Question of “Con
mares case we carefully refrained from
structive Fraud”

comment upon the second part of the
finding, because that part sent back to the trial court another
question which was not covered by the decision dealing with
liability for negligence. The second half of the judgment stated
that the lower court should submit to a jury the question whether
or not the facts of the case involved fraud—in other words the
question whether or not the audit had been so grossly negligent as
to justify a finding that the accountants had no genuine belief in
its adequacy. For, so the court said, that is fraud, while if less
than that is proved the ensuing liability is one for negligence and
is bounded by the contract. This threw the matter back into the
courts and it became, so far as the question of fraud was involved,
a matter sub judice and therefore not debatable. We have
waited for the determination of the case before venturing to
express any opinion on this second cause of action. Now it
appears that the case has been settled out of court. It is therefore
withdrawn from the docket and comment is permissible. In
order to make clear the arguments which seem pertinent the
following extracts are published:
“The second cause of action is yet to be considered.
“The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge,
that the balance-sheet was in accordance with the books of ac
count. If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated
because they believed it to be true. We think the triers of the
facts might hold it to be false. ...
“ In this connection we are to bear in mind the principle already
stated in the course of this opinion that negligence or blindness,
even when not equivalent to fraud, is none the less evidence to
2
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sustain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if the negligence
is gross. Not a little confusion has at times resulted from an
undiscriminating quotation of statements in Kountze v. Kennedy,
supra, statements proper enough in their setting, but capable of
misleading when extracted and considered by themselves.
‘Misjudgment, however gross,’ it was there observed, ‘or want
of caution, however marked, is not fraud.’ This was said in a
case where the trier of the facts had held the defendants guiltless.
The judgment of this court amounted merely to a holding that a
finding of fraud did not follow as an inference of law. There is no
holding that the evidence would have required a reversal of the
judgment if the finding as to guilt had been the other way.
Even Derry v. Peek, as we have seen, asserts the probative effect
of negligence as an evidentiary fact. . . .
“We conclude, to sum up the situation, that in certifying to the
correspondence between balance-sheet and accounts the defend
ants made a statement as true to their own knowledge when they
had, as a jury might find, no knowledge on the subject. If that
is so, they may also be found to have acted without information
leading to a sincere or genuine belief when they certified to an
opinion that the balance-sheet faithfully reflected the condition
of the business.
“Whatever wrong was committed by the defendants was not
their personal act or omission, but that of their subordinates.
This does not relieve them, however, of liability to answer in
damages for the consequences of the wrong, if wrong there shall
be found to be. It is not a question of constructive notice, as
where facts are brought home to the knowledge of subordinates
whose interests are adverse to those of the employer (Henry v.
Allen, 151 N. Y. 1; see, however, Am. L. Inst., Restatement of the
Law of Agency, Sec. 506, subd. 2a). These subordinates, so far
as the record shows, had no interests adverse to the defendants,
nor any thought in what they did to be unfaithful to their trust.
The question is merely this, whether the defendants, having
delegated the performance of this work to agents of their own
selection, are responsible for the manner in which the business of
the agency was done. As to that the answer is not doubtful. . . .
“Upon the plaintiff’s appeal as to the second cause of action,
the judgment of the appellate division and that of the trial term
should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide
the event.”
It will be noted that Justice Cardozo,

Fraud in Law Difficult
who rendered the judgment in the court
to Define

of appeals, clearly relieves the defend
ants from any imputation of intentional wrong-doing. This
does not relieve them, however, according to the learned judge, of
liability to answer in damages for the consequence of wrong “if
3
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wrong there shall be found to be.” Even the subordinates, who
were directly responsible for whatever neglect occurred, are not
accused of unfaithfulness. The whole question of fraud is ren
dered obscure and difficult because of the evident difference which
exists between the ordinary acceptation of the word and its legal
significance. An eminent lawyer writes us, “Fraud in the legal
sense is a somewhat elusive concept. Civil action for fraud
involves what in reality under the old distinction of forms of action
was the action of deceit. A consideration of the evidence which
may bear upon the question of deceit involves a very careful and
exact understanding of gross negligence and of silence in relation
to statements which may be alleged to involve deceit. All this
has a definite bearing upon what a certificate of an accountant
may import to persons who act upon the faith of it. Deceit does
not grow out of contract and no limitation upon liability for it
exists so as to make an accountant responsible in such action only
to the person with whom he has contracted.” In other words a
statement made in a professional capacity by any practitioner,
if it is made without reasonable assurance of its accuracy, may
be made the basis of an action for fraud by anyone who believes
himself to be injured by reliance upon that statement. That is a
broad extension of liability. Let us hope that the court in a given
case would prevent injustice by pointing out that the evidence
must show that there could have been no genuine belief in the
sufficiency of the audit before the auditors could be found guilty of
deceit or fraud. Probably nearly everyone will admit that fraud
in the ordinary meaning of the word should make the perpetrator
liable for whatever effect may follow his fraudulent act, but that
applies only in the case of intentional fraud. It is noteworthy
that in the case of Derry v. Peek, quoted in the judgment, Lord
Herschell said, “ In my opinion making a false statement through
want of care falls short of and is a very different thing from fraud.
I think mischief is likely to result from blurring the distinction
between carelessness and fraud and equally holding a man
fraudulent whether his acts can or can not be justly so desig
nated/’ The importance of that section of Lord Herschell’s
opinion is indicated by the fact (to which attention is drawn by
The Accountant, of London) that the head-note of the report
reads, “In an action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual
fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representa
tion has been made knowingly or without belief in its truth or
4
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recklessly without caring whether it be true or false. A false
statement made through carelessness and without reasonable
ground for believing it to be true may be evidence of fraud but
does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made
in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not
render the person making it liable to an action of deceit.”

If we interpret this decision as the lan
An Attempt to Inter
guage
seems to justify and if we may
pret the Decision
attempt to put it into ordinary straight
forward statement, it seems that the sum of the whole matter is
this: Gross negligence may be regarded as evidence that fraud
may have existed. That is to say, where a misstatement, due to
gross negligence, is made there is justification for going further
into the case to find out whether there was intentional wrong
doing or not. If it be found that the error was innocently al
though negligently made there is neither fraud nor deceit. To
put the matter in another way, it seems to us that the court says
that there was reason to investigate further and ascertain the
existence of fraud if any did exist. The court, however, explicitly
stated that there was nothing to indicate intentional wrong-doing
by defendants or their subordinates. It is therefore regrettable
that the case was not carried through the process of adjudication
without external settlement. As the matter stands at present
there is grave doubt in the minds of a great many people as to
what the court of appeals really meant. If our interpretation is
correct the court of appeals was evidently trying to encourage a
course of action which would bring about a definite adjudication
on the question of fraud to supplement the decision which had
been rendered on the question of liability to third parties even in
case of gross negligence. However, the withdrawal of litigation
prevented the accomplishment of that purpose, and in the mean
time every professional man is left in suspense lest by some
perfectly innocent error of judgment he be made the object of
an action for fraud.
What is the accountant to do? For one
What Is To Be Done? thing, it seems fairly clear that every
accountant's report will be addressed to
the client only and that any use of the report by the client will be
without the express knowledge of the accountant. It also seems
5
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probable that the accountant will divide his report into two sec
tions, one dealing with fact and one with opinion. This will have
an injurious effect upon the value of accountants’ reports, because
the client wants to know what the accountant thinks more than
he wants to know what are the facts. The facts, perhaps, he
could determine for himself, but he desires the opinions of a
competent expert. It has been suggested that accountants might
incorporate and thereby limit liability, but that is an unprofes
sional form of practice and would not prevent litigation. The
accountant perhaps should abandon certificates and merely make
reports without accepting any liability whatever. The word
certificate, which has been used for many years, is quite inappro
priate and should be abandoned, in any case, especially with
reference to any opinion. It is absurd to speak of certifying an
opinion. Perhaps the Ultramares case will be the means of
bringing about a reform which will eliminate the words certify
and certificate.
The present uncertainty can not con
tinue. Sooner or later there will be a
case which will be carried through with
out settlement and we shall learn what the courts believe to be the
correct definitions of fraud and liability. If the acts committed
by the defendants in the Ultramares case were fraudulent in the
true sense of the word the penalties should have been exacted. If
they were not fraudulent the defendants should have been
exonerated. Where negligence exists whatever penalty is just
should be paid; where fraud exists the proper punishment should
be inflicted—but in heaven’s name let us have something definite.
It is all well enough to talk grandiloquently about assuming the
full burden of responsibility for every word uttered. Accountants
must be careful and must tell the truth, but if they make a mistake
honestly it seems to the layman, at least, preposterous to suggest
that there has been fraud. We are not defending and do not care
to defend the act of any accountant who is guilty of fraud, but we
do desire to be known as opposing indefinite inference. Mean
while pending the coming of the settlement of the question a great
“racket” will follow the Ultramares judgment. Whenever, an
accountant renders a professional service he will be liable to strike
suits and goodness only knows what else in an effort to extort
money from him. The decision of the Ultramares case was well
6
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worth while, however, because it seems to have settled the ques
tion of liability for negligence to persons having no privity of
interest, which was the great point upon which the American
Institute argued and in doing so rendered a service to the entire
country.
A group of accountants in course of

“The American Stand
discussion of the existing conditions in
ard of Living ”

business turned to the question of
wages, particularly wages of the artisan class and those of un
skilled labor. The discussion was stimulated by recent remarks
by leaders of industry to the general effect that it was undesirable
and would be undesirable to reduce the scale of compensation for
labor, lest in the process the standard of living be lowered and the
general conditions of the country be thereby adversely affected.
The other side of the argument was represented by the writings of
various economists and others, some of whom had expressed the
opinion that, inasmuch as the cost of living had been substantially
reduced, there could be and should be a proportionate decrease in
the scale of wages without in any way affecting the so-called
standard of living. There seemed to be a wide difference of
opinion as to whether this reduction of wages, with certain excep
tions, represented the sounder policy or not. It is undoubtedly
true that there has been a great deal of nonsense spoken and writ
ten on the subject of the standard of living. It is certain the
American workman lives in what would be regarded as affluence
by the workmen of any other country. We have passed from the
days of the humble wants of the toiler to what may be called
“the two-car age.” He is, indeed, a poor man who can not
have two cars, one comparatively new and one still usable, in
his garage. Most of the men who are thus doubly blessed can
not really afford the luxury of two cars, but they are accustomed
to having what they want and as they want two cars we have
come into the two-car age, whether the grocer or the butcher
be paid or not. It is ridiculous to speak of these purely un
necessary luxuries as part of the standard of living. They may
be part of the standard of extravagance, but not of living. Then
again there seems to be no absolute necessity for many of the
enjoyments which are now regarded as part of the standard of
living. In the old days it was an event of importance to attend a
theatre or an entertainment of any sort. Now the entire family
7
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feels down-trodden if it can not be taken to the movies at least
twice a week. The manner of clothing has become extravagant,
and so have many other things, all of which the advocates of high
wages endeavor to disguise as the American standard of living.
But even supposing that it were true that these things were
necessary, it is difficult to understand how in a time of falling
prices the maintenance of high wages is necessary to the con
tinuance of that standard of living. For example, if a man’s
wages are ten dollars a day and it costs him nine dollars to live and
luxuriate, he is not as well off as he would be if his wages were six
dollars a day and his costs four dollars. In the latter case his
actual saving, if he saved, would be greater in number of dollars,
and when the difference in the value of the dollar is considered his
savings would be considerably more than doubled. All this is a
theory of economy which has been reiterated time and again.
The point which is of interest to accountants is the part which
they may play in bringing about better understanding of the true
conditions and in advocating the resumption of something like a
parity between wage and value received for the wage. To speak
of the maintenance of high wages in time of falling costs is to
speak of an enormous increase in wages. Take, for example, our
workman whose wages have been ten dollars a day—if costs of
living were nine dollars and they are now reduced to four dollars,
his margin of saving has increased from one to six dollars and he
still has the same necessities and luxuries which he had before.
Is there any justification for maintaining wages in a time of
depression when the maintenance of wages means an increase
in wages?
The trouble is that so many business
men who are employers of labor and
practically all politicians who depend
upon labor for their existence seem to feel that it is necessary to
pamper the working man at the cost of the stability of the coun
try. The workman is entitled to a fair wage if he does a day’s
work; indeed, it is safe to go further and say that he is entitled to
the utmost that can be paid him without injury to the general
conditions of the country, but that is not to say that he must have
his income remain intact or even increase while the man who
pays him that income has suffered losses which are almost destruc
tive. It is probably idle to hope for honest fairplay in the political
8
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arena. Whatever section of the community has the most votes
will have the most influence, and the men elected to office are, as
a rule, attentive only to the voices of their masters, the working
men’s organizations. We yield to no one in our desire for high
wages, but it does seem that the time has come to adopt a spirit of
common sense. In nearly every office the salaries of the “white
collar workers’’ have been reduced or, if not reduced, the staff has
been decimated and all new employees are engaged at much
lower compensation. In a great many industries men have been
compelled to limit their working days to two or three or four a
week so that the scale of wages might be maintained and our
blessed standard of living perpetuated. There are some work
men who seem to feel that if they work two days a week at ten
dollars a day they are infinitely better off than they would be
working six days a week at five dollars a day. The trouble with
such men is that they need a knowledge of the results of the
multiplication table.
Now accountants have an opportunity
Most
business men who employ the service of
professional accountants have confidence in their general sagacity
as well as in their specific expertness. A word of advice or warn
ing from the accountant does not go unheeded in most cases. Let
us assume that there is a factory employing a thousand men and
that the scarcity of orders has involved the reduction of working
days to two a week, but the scale of wages remains unaltered at
ten dollars a day. The result of this condition is that the thou
sand employees are receiving twenty thousand dollars a week.
The plant is closed on five days. There is the loss of efficiency
as well as the depreciation of physical assets inseparable from
shut-down. The men spend their idle five days doing prac
tically nothing and acquire habits of indolence. The market
for the product of the factory is supplied by the two days of work,
but there is no surplus, and we are told that reduction of surplus
is one of the most urgently needed reforms to hasten the return
of prosperity. It would be unwise to manufacture without a
market, but sooner or later the market is going to increase and the
demand for the product of the factory will return with surprising
rapidity. When once the spectre of fear has been laid low it will
be only a little time before buying begins in substantial volume.
9
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What is our factory to do then? The answer seems simple
enough. The men will be told that they can work three days a
week, then four and so on until the earning capacity of the fac
tory’s men has increased to sixty thousand dollars a week. That
sounds delightful, and it might be so if the price of the product of
the factory were to remain as it was before the depression, but we
all know that the prices of raw materials are now below the 1913
level—a consummation which the learned economists of many
universities stoutly affirmed could never occur. Retail prices
have not been reduced so far in proportion to the reduction of raw
materials, but prices find their level like water, and it is absolutely
sure that with low commodity prices there will follow low prices
of manufactured articles. Consequently, we shall come to a
point where our factory may have demand for enough product to
engage the services of the men for a full week, but the prices which
will be paid for the product will be out of line with the wage scale
of the factory, and the consequence will be failure. Either
wages must come down in the factory or prices must go up, and
there is small chance of the latter contingency for many years to
come. Now if there be an accountant engaged as consultant and
advisor to the factory he has a splendid opportunity to render a
genuine service. He may point out to his client the effect of the
existing policy, and if he be a man of vision and personality he
may do much in his intercourse with the employees to demonstrate
to them the economic soundness of the theory of fewer dollars but
equal wages.
Workmen are not fools and it is no un
common experience in conversation with
them to hear them express complete
willingness to accept a reduction of wages commensurate with the
cost of living. The workmen themselves are not the source of the
difficulty. It is the leaders of the workmen, most of whom
depend for existence upon agitation. They are the ones of whom
the politicians stand in fear. If the matter were left to the
workmen themselves it might be found that they would volun
tarily accept lower wages for longer hours. That is the end
devoutly to be desired. Idleness is not good for anyone, much as
most of us love it, and it is particularly evil when it is applied to
groups of people. The whole community is better if it works a
reasonable length of time for a reasonable wage. And it must
10
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not be forgotten that, whether we like it or not, there will be a
reduction of wages, and if it is kept away too long the force behind
will be dammed up and accumulated so that when it does burst it
will come through in ruinous immensity. Then we may see
wages reduced far below the actual needs of the workers. The
experience may be something like that of the stock market, which
kept piling up and piling up its inflated value until in spite of
warning it reached such a height that it toppled over—and great
was the fall of it. Wages may follow the same course if there be
not wisdom and common sense applied to the solution of the
present problem. If that disaster happens, which heaven forbid,
the labor leaders will be hard put to it to explain the reason of it.
All that some of them think of today is the maintenance of high
wages so that we may not do any damage to that idol which we
call the American standard of living. We need courage in our
leaders of industry, in our leaders of labor, in the men who are
supposed to lead in politics. Instead of followers we need real
leaders with honesty and vision and knowledge. The difficulty
is not insuperable. It will work out its own solution somehow,
but it may be very painful in the process. If we treat it wisely
and recognize truth as it appears we shall be able to avoid the
worst and gradually come into a condition of peaceful prosperity
and something approaching an equilibrium.

The Accountant, of London, in its issue
of April 11, 1931, reports that the coun
cil of the Institute of Chartered Ac
countants in Australia is enforcing a strict code of professional
etiquette.
“ It has resolved that the inclusion of the names of the members
in the classified section of the telephone directory is a form of
advertising, and that any references in publications should not
contain any allusions to professional appointments, other than
directorships of public companies, and that the insertion of such
matter should on no consideration be paid for. With regard to
certificates of estimated profits, it has been laid down that a
member of the institute is not permitted to give or sign in his own
or his firm’s name a certificate of estimated future profits of any
business, or contemplated business, for publication on the flota
tion, or contemplated flotation, of any company or corporation,
public or private. References to members in any prospectus or
document inviting the public to subscribe for shares or debentures
in any company or proposed company shall be confined to the
11
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professional designation of the member therein referred to. No
laudatory references will be permitted, and no member shall
permit his name to be used in any such document until the words
proposed to be used therein in respect of such member shall have
first been submitted to and approved by him. The council con
siders that the publishing of the name of a member on a prospec
tus, particularly one relating to potential profits, is unprofessional
conduct, and likely to bring the institute into disrepute. A
member is not permitted to allow his name to appear in any
prospectus which contains an unsigned estimate of future profits.
A rule has also been made that an associate not in practice shall
not undertake accountancy or auditing work for remuneration
outside of his duties to his employer or employers.”
It will be noted that the word “etiquette” is used by our con
temporary instead of the word “ethics,” but it does not seem to
us that the substitution is happy. There is a distinction between
ethics and etiquette. For example it may not be unethical to eat
with one’s knife, but all the canons of etiquette would be outraged
by such manners. The rules which are quoted are most interest
ing. They indicate that the ambition of the accountancy profes
sion to maintain the highest standard of practice is spreading
throughout the world. Some of the American accountants who
profess to believe that advertising should be permitted will prob
ably stand aghast at the thought that publication of names in a
classified telephone directory constitutes a breach of ethics. It
is undoubtedly true, however, that such publication is advertise
ment and it has always seemed to us that if advertisement is
wrong in one form it is wrong in all forms. (This refers, of course,
to the printed advertisement for which payment is made.) It is
gratifying to see that the Australian authorities forbid the certifi
cation of estimated profits. That inhibition is in harmony with
the decision of the American Institute of Accountants. Indeed the
whole scheme of behavior which is indicated by the Australian
council bears a striking resemblance to the rules of conduct pre
scribed by the American Institute. The accountants of Australia
are to be congratulated on the courage of their regulations.
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